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Introduction 
The IDA (since 2008, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC))  
is the national self-regulatory organization (SRO) that is responsible for policing investment 
dealers and Member firms that trade in the debt and equity markets in Canada (Jenah 2008: 1-4). 
IIROC sets educational requirements, ethical standards, and compliance rules that govern the 
conduct of its registered members and Member firms (Jenah, 2007: 2, 8, & 15). Registered 
members and Member firms must comply with these rules, or face penalties that range from a 
written reprimand to permanent bans from participating in the market (see IIROC, 2008: 4). 
IIROC’s nine District Councils across Canada are responsible for enforcing these rules (IIROC, 
2010: para. 1).  
An Overview of the Problem 
 
Public criticisms of the IDA being lenient on its members are well documented. One of the 
harshest critics of the IDA, Vancouver Sun columnist David Baines, argues “that the financial 
penalties” imposed by the IDA are “grossly inadequate” (Baines, 2006: para. 3). In one example 
an IDA Member firm and its three principals engaged in “persistent compliance breaches,” yet 
neither the Member firm nor the principals “were suspended for a single day. All they had to do 
was pay $1,775,000 in fines, and they were back in good standing” (para. 2). Others note “a 
widespread perception that the IDA is not impartial in its policing of the brokerage industry and 
that the penalties imposed on firms and their employees are often too lenient” (Howlett, 2003: 
para. 7). A task force commissioned by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) in 2001, found 
that “many do not perceive the IDA to be responsive to retail investors. It is seen as a trade 
association catering more to the interests of its members than to the interests of investors” 
(Ontario Securities Commission, 2003: 8157; also see Ojo, 2011: 142). 
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 Other problems with the enforcement arm of the IDA pertain to the manner in 
which complaints are resolved.  
 A review of IDA disciplinary actions by The Vancouver Sun shows that, in the 
four years and five months since [an] earlier audit [covering the period  from 
August 1995-July 1996], the IDA has not held a single contested hearing and has 
assessed only one suspension … (Baines, 2001: 14 emphases added).   
 
Even when fines are imposed, they are often not collected.  According to Baines,   
The Sun also found that, since the earlier audit, the IDA has assessed only 
$427,028 in fines, costs and disgorgements against British Columbia’s registrants, 
about 11 per cent of the national total. According to the IDA’s regional director 
Warren Funt, less than half this amount has actually been collected (Baines, 2006: 
para. 15). 
 
That said however, brokers must pay their fines to continue working in the industry (para. 15). 
Brokers “who have defaulted have left the industry, either by choice or because they cannot find 
employment “( para. 15).   
  
The accusations of weak enforcement forces one to ask the following question: are the 
penalties imposed by the IDA “grossly inadequate”?  To address this question, this article will 
analyze the aggravating and mitigating factors considered by the IDA’s hearing panels when 
determining penalties.  In order to do this, I will first conduct a brief review of the extant 
literature surrounding self-regulation in the securities industry. Next, I outline the methodology 
that was employed to collect and code the data. This is followed by an analysis of the major 
findings on the key aggravating and mitigating factors that were considered in penalty 
imposition. The study concludes with a review of the broader implications of the findings and 
recommendations for hearing panels to achieve consistency in enforcement hearings.  
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Self-regulation and its Application in the Securities Industry 
 Of the work that has been done on self-regulation in the securities industry to date, three 
key observations have emerged. First, from the empirical evidence presented, the penalties 
imposed by SROs on market participants are not proportionate to the offences. McCaffrey and 
Hart (1998) examined the regulatory activities of the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from 1990 to 1996 and found that there were 
firms that faced fewer regulatory sanctions and avoided major fines during the period (p. 17). 
DeMarzo, Fishman, and Hagerty (2005) analyzed the NYSE's enforcement of antifraud rules and 
found  that the organization chose a "lax enforcement policy," meaning it conducted  "less 
frequent investigations... than what customers would choose” (p. 687-688). Similarly, the 
Canadian Foundation for Advancement of Investor Rights (FAIR Canada)  reviewed the 
penalties imposed on fifteen high profile entities and individuals that were registered with the 
provincial securities commissions and SROsi in Canada, and found that the laxity of sanctions 
imposed by securities regulators "did not send a sufficiently strong deterrence message to market 
participants" (FAIR Canada, 2011: 26).  
 Second, there seems to be a consensus among the studies that the laxity of sanctions 
imposed by SROs, is a result of their willingness to protect the interests of their members at the 
expense of the investing public (see Brockman, 2004: 63; Dorn, 2011: 77-80 ). McCaffrey and 
Hart (1998) found that the larger retail firms in their study “faced fewer regulatory sanctions," 
while firms dealing with institutional investors "avoided major fines in the period" examined (p. 
17). The larger retail and institutional firms seem to be benefiting from their position in an 
industry that is funded mostly by its members. DeMarzo et al. (2005) started from the premise 
that the SRO’s “objective is to maximize the welfare of its members, the agents” (p. 688). 
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Consequently, SROs will choose an enforcement policy that will achieve this objective (Pp. 687-
688). These findings indicate that SROs get morphed into servicing their members and when the 
interest of the public clashes with the interests of the members, the SROs puts their members 
first (also see Rosen and Rosen, 2010: 30). 
 Third, SROs will chose an enforcement policy that is just stringent enough to avoid 
government intervention. DeMarzo et al. found that “the threat of government enforcement leads 
to more aggressive enforcement by the SRO” (2005: p. 689). However, this calculated approach 
to enforcement by SROs in the securities industries exposes “the SROs and member firms to 
hard questions when major violations surface” (McCaffrey & Hart, 1998: 43). Government 
regulators can most certainly scrutinize the SRO and inquire on “how decisively the…SRO 
remedied the violation and whether the case illustrates a wider breakdown in the …SROs 
[disciplinary] system” (p. 43). In such a scenario, “government oversight [whether it is central 
like the SEC in the U.S. or decentralized as in the provincial securities commissions in Canada] 
of self-regulation can benefit customers by leading the SRO to engage in more aggressive 
enforcement” (DeMarzo et al., 2005: 702). The SRO would retaliate proactively by “choos[ing] 
an enforcement policy that is just aggressive enough to pre-empt the government from doing its 
own enforcement” (p. 702).  
 As with most SROs, the enforcement of by-laws in the securities industry is done through 
administrative proceedings.  However, while the use of aggravating and mitigating factors in 
criminal proceedings are well documented, little, if anything is known about the use of these 
factors in administrative proceedings (see Kirchmeier, 1998: 361-374; Baldus, Woodworth, and 
Grosso, 2002:  508-514).  This study will attempt to address this gap by examining data from the 
IDA’s tribunal cases.  
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Data and Methods  
To eliminate arbitrariness in the decision making process, in 2003, the IDA adopted its new 
Disciplinary Sanction Guidelines (“Guidelines”). To conduct this research, Quicklaw’s database 
Securities Regulation Tribunal Decisions were searched for all decisions made by the IDA 
between 2003 and June of 2008. This paper analyzes the 238 cases that were found.  Of the 238 
cases, 25 were written in French, which were translated into English by a French- immersion 
Simon Fraser University graduate.  
The Guidelines list the aggravating and mitigating factors that hearing panels must take 
into consideration when determining sanctions. Central to the Guidelines is that “sanctions 
should be tailored to address the misconduct involved in a particular case,” and “a penalty must 
be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct and the relative degree of responsibility of a 
respondent" (IDA, 2006: 7). Each case was read twice and the aggravating and mitigating factors 
identified were coded using an excel spreadsheet (see IDA, 2006: 7-11).There were cases where 
aggravating factors were identified in the summary of facts, but were not explicitly considered in 
the imposition of sanctions by the hearing panels.  For example, there were cases where the 
hearing panels explicitly made reference to “losses to clients” as an aggravating factor; however, 
there were also cases where “losses to clients” were present in the material facts of the case, but 
were not identified as aggravating factors by the hearing panels when imposing penalties. These 
were coded as "Aggravating Factors Identified, But Not Considered." Therefore, the three 
attributes coded were: Aggravating Factors Identified and Considered (N=174), Aggravating 
Factors Identified, But Not Considered (N= 209), and Mitigating Factors (N= 378). 
5 
 
The Guidelines  (2006: 7-11) list the factors that the hearing panels should consider when 
determining sanctions for individual offenders and Member firms. The list is “illustrative, not 
exhaustive,” (2006: 7) and consists of the following factors:  
• Harm to Clients, Employer and/or the Securities Market  • Respondent's Blameworthiness • Degree of Participation • Extent to which the Respondent was Enriched by the Misconduct • Prior Disciplinary Record • Acceptance of Responsibilities, Acknowledgement of Misconduct and Remorse • Credits for Cooperation • Voluntary Rehabilitative Efforts • Reliance on the Expertise of Others • Planning and Organization • Multiple Incidents of Misconduct over an Extended Period of Time • Vulnerability of Victim • Failure to Cooperate with the Association’s Investigation • Significant Economic Loss to the Client and/or Member Firmii 
 
Findings 
 
Aggravating Factors 
 
 
Figure 1: Aggravating Factors Considered and Aggravating Factors Identified, But 
Not Considered in the Imposition of Penalties 
24% 
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15% 15% 14% 
7% 7% 
1% 
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20% 
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8% 
Aggravating Factors Identified and Considered (N=174)
Aggravating Factors Identified, But Not Considered (N=209)
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Figure 1 shows the aggravating factors that were identified and considered, as well as the 
aggravating factors that appeared in the factual description of the case but were not mentioned in 
the imposition of the penalties. With the exception of failure to cooperate, what stands out most 
is that for each factor, the proportion of aggravating factors that appeared in the factual 
description, but were not mentioned in the imposition of penalties, exceeded the proportion of 
aggravating factors that were considered in the imposition of sanctions by the hearing panels. 
This finding points to the possibility that the IDA hearing panels were more likely not to see 
(than to see) aggravating factors where they existed. 
Failure to Cooperate 
Failure to cooperate with the Association’s request for information comprised 24% of the 
aggravating factors considered in the imposition of penalties. The Association takes a 
Respondent’s “failure to attend and be questioned” by Enforcement staff as a serious issue 
because it “‘compromised the Association’s ability to complete [an] investigation’ ” (IDA v. 
Bagnell, 2003: para. 17). A failure to cooperate with the Association's request for information,  
“even if based upon a matter of principle, strikes at the very integrity of the Association’s duty 
and ability to police itself” (IDA v. Union Securities Ltd, 2005: 55). More importantly, the 
impact of non-compliance can “stop the investigation completely” (IDA v. Crittall, 2004: para. 
8). For example, in Stewart,  the Association noted that the “ Respondent's failure to provide the 
information and documentation and failure to attend for an interview, as requested, resulted in 
the Association not being able to proceed further in the investigation of the Respondent’s 
activities” (IDA v. Stewart, 2005: para. 15).  
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Planning and Organization 
Planning and organization made up 18% of the aggravating factors identified and 
considered in the imposition of penalties. In Armstrong, the Hearing Panel noted that  
[t]his was not an isolated incident or conduct involving a limited number of 
transactions over a limited period of time. The Respondent’s misconduct involved 
a large number of clients, hundreds of transactions and extended over a period of 
four years… and involved a loss of those clients of approximately $2 million… 
(IDA v. Armstrong, 2003: para. 37). 
 
 
In other cases, the Panel took into consideration the deliberate or intentional conduct of 
the Respondent.  In Djordjevic, the Panel noted that “[t]he respondent's behaviour was 
egregious. He deliberately forged the signature of a client on a guarantee of another 
client's account. His activity was not negligent, but deliberate and deceptive” (IDA v. 
Djordjevic, 2007: para: 46).  In McCaffrey, the Panel reasoned that “[t]he Respondent's 
violations extended over several months… His conduct was … serious, wrong, 
fraudulent, conscious and deliberate” (IDA v. McCaffrey, 2003: para. 18).  
Figure 1 also shows that in 19% of the cases where issues regarding planning and 
organization of the offence existed, the panels did not identify them as such in the imposition of 
penalties. These issues were no different from the issues that were identified as planning and 
organization of the offence, and considered in the imposition of penalties in other cases. For 
example, in IDA v. Tang (2003), the respondent was involved in the planning and organization of 
the offence, yet the Panel did not identify this as an aggravating factor in the imposition of 
penalties. More specifically, the respondent misappropriated approximately $925,000 from the 
accounts of family and friends by causing the Member firm “to engage in transactions involving 
the exchange of Canadian dollars and US dollars with the holders of the accounts which 
improperly benefited the holders of the accounts…( IDA v. Tang, 2003). Similarly, in another 
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case involving 33 clients and 76 acts of forgery, planning and organization of the offence was 
present, but was not identify by the Hearing Panel when determining penalties. In the IDA v. 
Holowatiuk  
[t]he Respondent has advised the Association that he committed the acts of 
forgery as a response to his emotions of feeling overwhelmed at times by the 
number of referrals and the paperwork involved in the transaction of his business 
and the lack of administrative support (IDA v. Holowatiuk, 2004: para. 16). 
These examples suggest that even though there was evidence of pre-mediation and planning in 
the respondents’ conduct, they were not addressed by the hearing panels when determining the 
penalties they imposed. 
Multiple Incidents of Misconduct over an Extended Period of Time  
Multiple incidents of misconduct over an extended period of time made up 15% of the 
aggravating factors identified and considered, and 22% of aggravating factors mentioned in the 
facts, but not considered in the imposition of penalties. In assessing multiple incidents of 
misconduct over an extended period of time, the hearing panels seemed to put considerable 
weight on repeated behaviour that ignored the “red flags,” which led to the misconduct.  In 
Graham, the Hearing Panel noted that even though there was only one error, in their view,   
“the error was seminal and grave and was repeated over and over. Mr. G… was 
presented with many "red flags" - as the Guidelines label them - and he chose to 
ignore them (IDA v. Graham, 2005: para. 28).  
In other cases, the hearing panels looked at the extent of the misconduct when considering 
sanctions. In Armstrong, the Panel noted that what was  
[m]ost important is the scope of the Respondent's misconduct. This was not an 
isolated incident or conduct involving a limited number of transactions over a 
limited period of time. The Respondent's misconduct involved a large number of 
clients, hundreds of transactions and extended over a period of four years (IDA v. 
Armstrong, 2003: para. 37).  
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Similarly, in Michaels, the Panel noted that “[t]he Respondent's deception of the Association 
continued over an extended period of time and had the effect of delaying completion of the 
Association's investigation” (IDA v. Michaels, 2007: para: 26). 
Although the hearing panels considered multiple incidents of misconduct over an 
extended period of time in some cases, in other cases such behavior was present but not 
addressed by the hearing panels when considering sanctions. For example, in one case, the 
Respondent admitted that  
B]etween September 2000 and February 2002 while employed as a Registered 
Representative at Canaccord Capital Corporation, a Member firm, the 
Respondent, effected 7 unauthorized transactions in the accounts of 3 separate 
clients, namely; DM, HM, and SN without prior authorization from those clients 
and thereby acted contrary to Association By-law 29.1. (IDA v. Miller, 2005: 
para. 50).  
 
 
In another case, the Respondent misappropriated funds from clients and her employer over a two 
year period without being detected  by regulatory authorities (see IDA v. Judt, 2005: para. 4). 
Likewise from January, 2001 to June, 2001 
the Respondent engaged in the conduct of forgery of the signature of V.E, at all 
material times a Registered Representative with the Member, BMO Nesbitt 
Burns, to V.E. client account documentation, which conduct is unbecoming a 
registrant and detrimental to the public interest, contrary to Association By-law 
29.1 (IDA v. Blaker, 2007: para. 42) 
 
These are just a few examples of cases where multiple incidents of misconduct were identified, 
but appeared not to be taken into consideration in the imposition of the penalties.  
Economic Loss to Client and/or Member Firm 
 Economic loss to the client and/or Member firm made up only 15% of aggravating 
factors identified and considered in the imposition of sanctions.  The identification of losses 
taken into account by the hearing panels was rather straightforward. In Thompson, the Panel 
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noted that “[t]he Respondent’s clients lost one quarter or more of their investment together with 
the opportunity costs on the funds recovered” (IDA v. Thompson, 2004: para. 74). Similarly, in 
Gareau, the Panel took into consideration the fact that "[v]ery significant losses were caused as a 
result of the Respondent's conduct... No fewer than 14 clients lost a total of $724,000 (IDA v. 
Gareau, 2005: para.  68).  
More striking however, is that in 20% of the cases, losses to clients’ accounts were 
mentioned but not considered in the imposition of sanctions. In one case, a married couple lost 
$202,000 in unauthorized trades from their joint account (see IDA v. Brazeau, 2005: para. 7-17). 
In Konidis, the investors “lost their entire investment …which totaled $26,353.80” (IDA v. 
Konidis, 2003: para. 19). Similarly, in Grieve, a 63 year-old widow lost $150,000 because of 
unsuitable investments; another client who was a “50-year-old electrician with less than a 
complete high school education and very limited investment knowledge…lost his entire 
investment …a total of approximately $22,400”  (IDA v. Grieve, 2003: para. 5 and 6). Yet, none 
of the losses incurred in these cases were used as an aggravating factor in considering the 
appropriate penalties.  
Harm to clients, employers and/or the securities market 
Harm to clients, employers and/or the securities market were only identified and 
considered as aggravating factors in 14% of the cases. In the majority of the cases, the amount of 
financial losses incurred by the clients was the key factor that was taken into consideration in 
determining what constitutes harm.  In Youden for example, the Panel noted that two of the 
Respondent’s clients “sustained losses over a two year period” (IDA v. Youden, 2005: para. 116). 
In Leung, the Panel noted that the Respondent “fraudulently circumvented regulatory 
requirements resulting in substantial harm to members of the investing public” (IDA v. Leung, 
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2005: para. 1). In Djordjevic, the Panel stated that "[f]orgeries of this nature cause harm to the 
employer and harm to the securities markets... They sap the confidence of market participants 
that the system operates fairly and honestly" (IDA v. Djordjevic, 2007: para. 50).  
Approximately 18% of the cases involved harm that was identified, but not considered as 
an aggravating factor. In keeping with the trend to identify harm based on financial losses, the 
Panel in Dempsey noted that 
[f]rom January 1, 2000 to June 30, 2002 MAP's RIF Account had a rate of return 
of -70% and the value of the account declined by $38,589.53. From January 1, 
2000 to August 31, 2001 the C Margin Account had a rate of return of -48% and 
the value of the account declined by $97,627.93 and RC's RSP Account had a rate 
of return of -29% and the value of the account declined by $20,040.39… (IDA v. 
Dempsey, 2005).  
 
All of the clients' accounts noted above declined substantially in value, but at no point 
throughout the case were there any references made to the harm caused to the clients. In another 
case, the Respondent and the Branch Manager were “involved in an illegal distribution of 
securities by breaching the prospectus exemption available under the Alberta Securities Act” and 
contravened the Member firms’s policies (IDA v. Cubbon, 2006: para. 17 and 21). Yet, the 
Hearing Panel neither identified nor considered such conduct as harmful to the Member and 
securities market.  
Respondents' Enrichment 
The Respondents’ enrichment comprised 7% of the aggravating factors that were 
identified and considered in the imposition of sanctions. In assessing the “extent to which the 
respondent was enriched by the misconduct,” particular attention was given to the commissions 
earned from the misconduct.  In Armstrong, the Panel found "that the Respondent benefited 
significantly from the misconduct in question... her commission participation in the transactions 
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complained of over the period of five years amounted to $241,000.00 (IDA v. Armstrong, 2003: 
para.39). Similarly, in Dimitriadis, the Panel highlighted the fact that the Respondent made 
$76,000 in gross commission, of which 68% was given to him (IDA v. Dimitriadis, 2004: para. 
185).  In Petriello, the Panel made reference to the fact that “[t]he Respondent misappropriated 
amounts totaling $124,000 belonging to his client over a long period of almost two years" during 
which, he continued to benefit from the scheme (IDA v. Petriello, 2007: para. 25).  
The Respondents’ enrichment comprised 13% of the aggravating factors identified, but 
were not considered in the imposition of penalties. Note that this is five percentage points more 
than the number actually considered as aggravating factors by the hearing panels.  In one 
particular case, the commission charged by the Respondent was more than half of the client’s 
original investment (IDA v. Xiao, 2004: para. 35-39). The client “was single, 42 years old, 
employed as a hotel housekeeper for an annual salary of $20, 000,” and “deposited $50,000 in 
her account; however, the “total purchases amounted to approximately CDN $8,276,047” (para. 
18, 36, and 38). The client reportedly “paid approximately CDN $25,258 in commissions” for 
these purchases (para. 39). There were also cases where the Respondent benefitted financially 
from fees charged, but these fees were not considered as enrichment by the Hearing Panel. For 
example, in Tobin, the Respondent was involved in discretionary trading in six clients’ accounts 
(IDA v. Tobin, 2006). “All of the client accounts...were fee based accounts” (para. 64).  
The Respondent's gross fees for this time period (January 2003 to April 2003) for 
the above client accounts were approximately $60,000. After deductions for his 
split (50/50) and reasonable branch expenses that the Respondent was required to 
cover, the agreed upon amount to be repaid for fees is accordingly $28,000 (para. 
64). 
Yet, in discussing the aggravating factors in this case, no reference was made by the Hearing 
Panel to the Respondent’s enrichment (see para. 5-9).  
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Vulnerability of Victims 
The vulnerability of victims was only taken into account as an aggravating factor in 7% 
of the cases. In Hart, the Respondent misappropriated funds from two elderly widows’ accounts. 
In determining the appropriate penalties, the Panel noted that the case “showed a clear plan of 
forgery and deceit and was an egregious breach of trust committed against two vulnerable 
individuals” (IDA v. Hart, 2006: para. 10).  In other cases, the Hearing Panel focused on the level 
of the clients' market sophistication. In determining the Respondent's penalties in Yanor, the 
Panel made reference to the fact that the client's “sophistication was minimal” (IDA v. Yanor, 
2005: para. 27). In Schillaci, the client's inability to recognize an experienced advisor, made the 
client vulnerable in the eyes of the Hearing Panel (IDA v. Schillaci, 2007: para. 84).  
In 8% of the cases, the vulnerability of victims was identified, but was not considered in 
the imposition of sanctions.  In Wong for example, the Respondent recommended and purchased 
Government of Argentina bonds for six elderly and unsophisticated clients "without first using 
due diligence to ensure that the recommendation was suitable for those clients based on their 
financial situation, investment knowledge, investment objectives and risk tolerance" (IDA v. 
Wong, 2005: para. 62). These recommendations resulted in significant losses to the clients' 
accounts. In one particular instance, the clients were an elderly married couple who could not 
"read English and...went to the Respondent's office on a monthly basis because they had 
difficulties understanding their monthly account statements" (para. 55). In Gurion, the 
Respondent misappropriated $353,587 from an 89 year old novice female investor, and then left 
Canada and settled in Russia (IDA v. Gurion, 2004: para. 2 and 10). While the Panel 
acknowledged the “extreme gravity of the Respondent's conduct,” at no point did they allude to 
the client's vulnerability as an aggravating factor (para. 8).   
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Mitigating Factors 
 
Figure 2 Mitigating Factors Considered in the Imposition of Penalties  
No Prior Disciplinary Records 
 Figure 2 presents the mitigating factors considered by the hearing panels in the 
imposition of penalties.  The Respondents’ lack of a “prior disciplinary record” made up 24% of 
the mitigating factors considerd by the hearing panels, and  was often used to mitigate against 
harsher penalties. In Chan, the fact that the Respondent had no prior record was one of the 
factors taken into consideration in reducing her penalty from a fine of $3,000 to a reprimand 
(IDA v. Chan, 2003: para. 2-3). Similarly, in Loftus, the Panel reduced the fine from $30,000 to  
$25,000, and the costs from $10,000 to $7,500, taking into account the cooperation of the 
Respondent and the fact that he did not have a prior disciplinary record (see IDA v. Loftus, 2004: 
para. 27). In Wright, the Panel's decision was influenced by the fact that, "in a career of some 25 
24% 
21% 
19% 
13% 
8% 
6% 
4% 
2% 2% 
1% 
N=378 
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years in the industry Mr. W has never been the subject of any disciplinary action" (IDA v. 
Wright, 2005: 5).  
The acceptance of responsibilities, acknowledgement of misconduct and remorse 
 
The acceptance of responsibilities, acknowledgement of misconduct and remorse, made 
up 21% of the mitigating factors considered in the imposition of sanctions. When this was 
considered as one of the mitigating factors against harsher sanctions, the hearing panels made 
specific reference to the Respondents' acknowledgement of their responsibilities and misconduct. 
In Gawthrop, the Panel noted that "the Respondent should not be visited with a serious fine 
because...he admitted his responsibility" for his misconduct (IDA v. Gawthrop, 2003: para. 10).  
Similarly, in Saturley, the Panel noted that "[t]he Respondent appears to have accepted his 
responsibility in this matter" (IDA v. Saturley, 2004: para. 8). In other cases, the hearing panel 
noted that the acceptance of responsibility included or implied remorse. For example in Graham, 
the Panel reasoned that "there is agreement that Graham has accepted responsibility and is 
remorseful"(IDA v. Graham, 2005: para. 26). Likewise in De Long, the Panel stated that one of 
the reasons that they accepted the Settlement agreement was because the Respondent "admitted 
to the inappropriateness of his conduct and has expressed remorse regarding any negative impact 
his conduct may have had upon the reputation of [the Member firm] and its business relationship 
with its trustee" (IDA v. De Long, 2005: para. 10).   
Credit for Cooperation 
Credit for cooperation made up 19% of the mitigating factors considered in the 
imposition of sanctions. In assessing this factor, the hearing panels paid particular attention to 
whether or not the Respondent fully cooperated with the Association's investigation. In 
Boulieris,  
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the Association's investigators acknowledged that the Respondent had co-
operated with every aspect of the investigation and had provided all requested 
files and documents (IDA v. Boulieris, 2003: 29).  
In Thompson, the Panel noted that the Respondent  
 has cooperated throughout with the Association in its investigation ...Most 
importantly, the Respondent did not walk away from the situation. Using his own 
resources, he pursued [Mr. D] with the Department of Lawyer Regulation of the 
Florida State Bar. It is largely due to his efforts that the majority of the money 
was recovered for the investors in the Debtors Certificates (IDA v. Thompson, 
2004: para.87-88).  
In Doering, the Panel noted that the Respondent's cooperation worked to advance the 
proceedings by “collaborati[ng] with enforcement counsel to produce the Agreed Statement of 
Facts” (IDA v. Doering, 2007: para. 20). By doing so, the Respondent saved the Association 
from incurring unnecessary costs and a great deal of time (para. 20).  
Voluntary Rehabilitative Efforts 
Voluntary rehabilitative efforts by the Respondents made up 13% of the mitigating 
factors taken into consideration by the hearing panels when imposing sanctions. In considering 
voluntary rehabilitative efforts as a mitigating factor, the hearing panels took into consideration 
acts of restitution taken on behalf of the Respondents. In determining the appropriate penalties in 
Chan, 
 the Association considered a number of unique mitigating factors which included 
the fact that full restitution had been paid to the clients; the [R]espondent, 
currently aged 69, had delayed her retirement in order to continue to make 
restitution payments to her former employers (IDA v. Chan, 2003: para. 2). 
 
In Clarke, The Panel noted that the Respondent’s employer 
 has entered into settlement arrangements with the involved clients. It is believed 
the total losses will in the range of $500,000.00. The Respondent has contributed 
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the sum of $368,000.00 toward those settlements. He substantially liquidated his 
financial holdings and mortgaged his interest in his matrimonial residence to do 
so (IDA v. Clarke, 2007: para. 19). 
 
Blameworthiness 
Respondents' blameworthiness made up 8% of the mitigating factors considered in the 
imposition of sanctions. When considering blameworthiness, the hearing panels took into 
consideration “illness or other extenuating circumstances of a personal nature [that] may have 
[an impact] on a registrant’s relative blameworthiness” (IDA, 2006b: 7). In Brennan, the Panel 
was advised that “Mr. B had suffered from severe depression and psychological illness” (IDA v. 
Brennan, 2004: para. 12). In Pryde, the Panel took into consideration that the Respondent   
was suffering from severe manic episodes diagnosed as bi-polar disorder for 
which he has been under regular treatment. This disorder necessitated him being 
hospitalized between July 28, 1998 and September 1, 1998 and between February 
23, 2000 and March 2, 2000…. (IDA v. Pryde, 2005: para. 6). 
 
Similarly in Clarke, the Panel made reference to the fact that the Respondent  
unauthorized trading in the CA and RC accounts was the result of a combination 
of the extreme personal stress he was under at the time, both at home and at work, 
and his wanting ‘to do very well for CA and RC’. Clarke has been undergoing 
therapy in order to deal with the underlying conditions that caused his behaviour 
(IDA v. Clarke, 2007: para. 50).  
 
No Enrichment, Losses and Harm to Clients 
 
Even though enrichment, losses and harm to clients were cited as aggravating factors, 
there were also times when they were considered as mitigating factors by the hearing panels. As 
can be seen in Figure 2, respondents not enriched by their misconduct made up 6% of the 
mitigating factors considered in the imposition of sanctions, while no losses and harm to clients' 
accounts made up 4% and 2% respectively. In Graham for example, the Panel noted that "there 
was agreement that Mr. G. was not enriched" by his misconduct (IDA v. Graham, para. 26). 
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Similarly, in Blaker, the Panel “acknowledged...that the Respondent did not receive any financial 
benefit” from her acts (IDA v. Blaker, 2007: para. 21).  In references to losses, the Panel in 
Cooney, noted that "[n]o client suffered any loss as a result of any of the" misconduct described 
in the material facts of the case (IDA v. Cooney, 2004: para. 38). With references to harm, the 
Panel in Bell noted that “[t]here was no malicious intent on the part of the Respondent, [and] no 
harm to clients resulted from the violations” (IDA v. Bell, 2005: para. 3). In Gordon, the Panel 
argued that there was no identified illegal trading and therefore no harm to the Respondent's 
clients and the capital market (IDA v. Gordon, 2006).  
Reliance on the Expertise of Others and Degree of Participation 
A closer look at Figure 9-2 shows that reliance on the expertise of others (2%), and 
degree of participation (1%), only made up 3% of the mitigating factors considered in the 
imposition of penalties.  In the few cases where the reliance on the expertise of others was 
considered as a mitigating factor, the Panel put a lot of weight on “whether a respondent 
demonstrated reasonable reliance on supervisory, legal or accounting advice that subsequent to 
the misconduct in question was found to have been erroneous”(IDA, 2006b: 10). For example, in 
Gareau, the Panel noted that "[t]he fact that Mr. G relied on Mr. Graham and was encouraged to 
do so by his employer is definitely a mitigating factor" (IDA v. Gareau, 2005: para. 68). With 
reference to Respondent’s' "degree of participation"  as a mitigating factor, the Panel considered 
the Respondent's diminished responsibility in the wrongdoing. In Gareau, the Panel noted that, 
“[a]lthough the Respondent was negligent, his responsibility [was] significantly diminished 
because of his reliance on his supervisor, SG” (IDA v. Gareau, 2005: para. 68). Similarly, in 
Youden, the Panel acknowledged that 
Mr. Y relied on the word and honesty of Mr. B when he should have, among other 
things, called the clients to confirm that the trading activity in their accounts was 
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in accordance with their investment objectives and instructions. While this Panel 
found that such reliance was inappropriate in view of the many red flags in 
existence, it is clear that Mr. Y ha[d] a lesser level of complicity than Mr. B, who 
was a more direct perpetrator (IDA v. Youden, 2005: para. 118). 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Despite the widespread use of SROs to regulate various occupations, SROs remain an 
understudied institution. This research was designed to gain insight into how one SRO’s 
disciplinary panels (the IDA) used predetermined aggravating and mitigating factors to discipline 
its wayward members. When examining the aggravating factors identified and considered in the 
imposition of sanctions, failure to cooperate with the Association's investigation stands out. 
Failure to cooperate creates a major threat to an SRO’s ability to regulate its members, so it was 
expected that it would be a significant factor. 
What was unexpected (and perhaps ought not to have been unexpected) was that the   
aggravating factors identified and considered were fewer in number than the aggravating factors 
identified but not considered by the hearing panels when imposing penalties.  One plausible 
explanation for this outcome was that in cases where aggravating factors were identified and 
considered, they were more serious and transparent in nature, and as such, the hearing panels had 
no other options but to consider them when determining penalties.   
Another finding was that the IDA’s hearing panels were more likely to identify 
mitigating (N=378) rather than aggravating factors (N=174) when considering the appropriate 
penalties to be imposed on registrants.  Was this because the hearing panels were more 
preoccupied with identifying mitigating factors that would in turn lead to less severe penalties for 
their members? Were hearing panels reluctant to impose heavy fines that might result in a 
registered representative weighing the cost and benefits of paying the fines and deciding to quit 
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the industry?  In such cases, the hearing panels may find it appropriate to apply mitigating 
factors and impose lighter penalties on the accused.  
In the IDA v Derivative Services Inc, the Hearing Panel noted that one of the objectives in 
determining sentencing is the "[p]rotection of the investing public" (IDA v Derivative Services 
Inc, 2000: 3).  The task ahead is to evaluate how the aggravating and mitigating factors cited by 
the hearing panels work to protect the public interest.  Of particular concern are losses to clients 
and harm to clients, employer and/or the securities market. As mentioned earlier, losses to clients 
and harm to clients, employer and/or the securities market only made up about 15% and 14% of 
the aggravating factors considered when imposing penalties, as opposed to 20% and 18% of 
aggravating factors identified but not considered.  One would assume that financial losses and 
harm to clients, are two of the most important aggravating factors to consider in sentencing 
decisions (see New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 1997: para 3). Since these factors were mostly 
ignored, it is difficult to comprehend how and in what context the public interest was served 
when considering penalties. By ignoring these aggravating factors, an argument can be made that 
lighter penalties were probably imposed on the accused for their misconduct. The lesser 
proportion of these two aggravating factors being considered, suggests that the penalties imposed 
on the offenders did not fit the offences (also see New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 1997: para 3).  
Given that the primary objective of penalties is the public interest, one would have thought that 
hearing panels would be more inclined to place increased emphasis on factors such as loss and 
harm to clients, Member firms, and the securities market when determining the appropriate 
sanctions.  
Another point of contention is the role that mitigating factors that are not directly related 
to the offender's conduct, played in penalty imposition (see New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 
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1997: para 6-10). Post-offence mitigating factors such as responsibility and remorse, credit for 
cooperation, voluntary rehabilitee efforts and reduced blame were among the most frequent 
factors taken into consideration by hearing panels to mitigate against harsher penalties against 
the offenders. The problem with this is that one cannot know for sure if the offenders were 
showing genuine remorse or were making a calculated effort to cooperate because they knew 
there was a mountain of evidence stacked up against them.  Added to these, is the fact that 
wealthier offenders and Member firms will be at an advantage over their contemporaries because 
they have the resources and therefore will be more likely to involve in some form of 
rehabilitative effort geared to compensate the victims (see New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 
1997: para. 5)..  Victims' preferences to be compensated, along with  the fact that wealthier 
offenders have more resources at their disposal to negotiate deals with the IDA's investigation 
staff, can all contribute to them receiving lighter penalties (see Reynolds, 2007: 184;  New 
Zealand Ministry of Justice, 1997: para: 5).   
The IDA's Sanction Guidelines simply list the factors that should be taken into 
consideration by hearing panels when determining sanction.  As the name suggests, the Sanction 
Guidelines are just "Guidelines." Hearing panels can use their discretion to apply the Sanction 
Guidelines in whatever way they see fit. The problem however, is when the hearing panels use 
the Guidelines in an arbitrary manner to impose lighter sanctions on the offenders. There needs 
to be a uniform approach when applying the Guidelines to ensure consistency in the imposition 
of penalties. To achieve consistency, the IDA's hearing panels must seriously take into 
consideration the factors listed in the Sanction Guidelines and apply them methodologically to 
each case (also see Buttigieg, 2012: 442-423). By acknowledging the aggravating and mitigating 
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factors in each case when determining a penalty, the IDA (now IIROC) will be one step closer to 
serving in the public interest and the criticism that their penalties are “grossly inadequate.”  
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Notes 
1
 In addition to the IIROC, the other SROs which operate in the Canadian securities industry are 
the Mutual Fund Dealers Association (MFDA) and Chambre de la sécurité financière (CSF) in 
Quebec.  
2
 See the IDA's Disciplinary Sanction Guidelines (2006:7-11) for a description of the key 
considerations when determining sanctions.  
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